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Nicholas Wade and Race: Building a Scientific Façade

Jennifer Raff

A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New
York: Penguin Press, 2013. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.

For he will say to himself that he has no right to give names to objects which he
cannot define.
—Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man

Do “races” exist as meaningful biological categories?1 Physical anthropologists and
human biologists have been studying race (e.g., blacks vs. whites, or Europeans vs.
Asians) for centuries. For most of that time they subscribed to the perspective that race
was a taxonomic category, and they sought to identify the biological traits (e.g., cranial
shape or skin color) that characterized and defined these different groups. This
perspective assumed that each individual was a member of a single racial category, that
the differences between racial categories were biological, and that these categories were
predictive of other traits like ancestry, temperament, intelligence, or health (Linnaeus
1758; Morton 1839; Hooton 1939).
But it gradually became clear that this classificatory approach was not
scientifically sound. Grouping people by skin color into “continental races” (Africans,
Asians, Europeans) did not produce the same result as grouping people by skull shape or

by such traits as susceptibility to sickle cell disease (Livingstone 1962; Relethford 2009).
Furthermore, as scientists began to study human variation with the tools of genetics, it
became obvious that human genetic variation does not divide humans into a few discrete
groups. There are virtually no sharp boundaries, either with physical features or with
patterns of genetic diversity, that show where one population “ends” and the next
“begins” (Livingstone 1962; Lewontin 1972; Jorde et al. 2000; Relethford 2009; Long et
al. 2009; Templeton 2013).
These observations have led the majority of physical anthropologists, human
biologists, human geneticists, and sociologists in recent decades to conclude that the
racial groups we recognize are social categories constructed in a specific cultural and
historical setting, even if we consider physical features when categorizing people
(Pigliucci 2013; Duster 2005). These social categories have biological consequences; for
example, someone who experiences the stress of racism may be more likely to develop
high blood pressure and hypertension than someone who does not (Gravlee 2009;
Sullivan 2013).
However, according to former New York Times science writer Nicholas Wade, we
should never have stopped thinking of race as a biological taxonomic category. In his
book A Troublesome Inheritance, Wade takes it upon himself to educate scientists about
the errors of our interpretations of human genetic diversity.
Wade claims that the latest genomic findings actually support dividing humans
into discrete races and that the genetic makeup of different races contributes to behavioral
and economic disparities. In a spectacular failure of logic, he asserts that those who

disagree that races are meaningful biological categories in humans must also think that
human populations do not differ genetically or have not been affected by evolution.
There is a lot to criticize in this book, particularly Wade’s imaginative storytelling
in chapters 6–10 (“a much more speculative arena,” as he puts it [15]). He explains that
English populations have a “willingness to save and delay gratification,” which “seems
considerably weaker in tribal societies” (184–185), and these differences must be
genetically based, despite his admission that “the genetic underpinnings of human social
behavior are for the most part still unknown” (15). In chapter 8, he asserts that Jews are
adapted for capitalism in a manner analogous to the Eskimo’s adaptation to survival in an
Arctic environment (214—an assertion unsupported by scientific evidence, to put it
mildly. (Wade seems to be unaware of the consequences of laws prohibiting Jews from
owning land and farming over much of Europe for centuries—and instead speculates that
“the adaptation of Jews to capitalism is another such evolutionary process” [214].)But the
central foundation of Wade’s argument is the scientific justification of the folk
classification of race. He writes: “At least at the level of continental populations, races
can be distinguished genetically, and this is sufficient to establish that they exist” (122).
If Wade is right and races are distinct biological categories, then we would reasonably
expect that they would be unambiguously different from each other genetically and
physically (as well as behaviorally, according to Wade). One should be able to define
each race with a set of objective criteria, which could be used by any person to
independently reach the same classifications (and number of classifications) as Wade.
Furthermore, these categories should have predictive power; that is, features that define
race should be in concordance with new discoveries of genetic diversity.

What Is Race, According to Wade?
Wade never provides a clear definition of “race” in this book. He tries to rely instead on
loose associations rather than definitive characteristics, which forces him (like Hooton
1918, 1931) to conclude both that physical traits define race but that the traits can vary
from person to person: “Races are identified by clusters of traits, and to belong to a
certain race, it’s not necessary to possess all of the identifying traits” (121).
With such a shifty, casual footing, it’s no surprise that Wade’s conclusions are
unsound. He can’t keep the number of races straight (see Table 1). Wade can’t settle on a
definite number of races because he can’t come up with a consistent, rigorous definition
of what “race” means. He freely uses such terms as “major race,” “race,” “subrace,”
“group,” and “population” but doesn’t provide any serious, objective ways to distinguish
among these terms for arbitrary groupings of people.2
Wade seems to realize the contradictory claims of his premise but tries to have it
both ways: “Such an arrangement, of portioning human variation into five continental
races, is to some extent arbitrary. But it makes practical sense. The three major races are
easy to recognize. The five-way division matches the known events of human population
history. And, most significant of all, the division by continent is supported by genetics”
(94).
To support this claim, Wade relies heavily on a study published by Rosenberg et
al. (2002) that used a program called Structure to group people based on similarities in
short tandem repeat markers distributed across the genome. He notes that the program
identified five major clusters in this 2002 study, which corresponded to the major

geographic regions of the world (Africa, Eurasia, East Asia, Oceania, and America).
Therefore, Wade argues, these results clearly show that humans are divided up into racial
categories that match continents.
Charles Murray, coauthor with Richard Herrnstein of the book The Bell Curve
(1994)—which claimed that genetically based differences in intelligence between blacks
and whites (as measured by IQ) could explain social and economic disparities, and was
widely criticized (see Alland et al. 1996)—recently reviewed Wade’s book in the Wall
Street Journal. He stated that “a computer given a random sampling of bits of DNA that
are known to vary among humans—from among the millions of them—will cluster them
into groups that correspond to the self-identified race or ethnicity of the subjects. This is
not because the software assigns the computer that objective but because those are the
clusters that provide the best statistical fit” (Murray 2014) But Wade and Murray are both
wrong. While the program Structure can be a useful tool for inferring individual ancestry,
it requires (1) an understanding of the assumptions inherent in the clustering algorithms
and (2) cautious interpretation of the results. Because of these caveats, careful and
rigorous scientists generally view the “best” clustering scheme as a starting point for
generating testable hypotheses about ancestry and population history, not as the basis for
slicing the species into a discrete number of groups or races.
Structure is a program that assigns individual genotypes to hypothetical
populations or ancestry groupings (Bolnick 2008). It assumes that populations are in
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and that loci are not in linkage disequilibrium (Pritchard et
al. 2000). Results produced from this analytical tool are extremely sensitive to a number
of factors, including models (i.e., correlated vs. uncorrelated allele frequencies), the type

and number of genetic variants studied, and the number of populations included in the
analysis (Rosenberg et al. 2005). The authors of Structure also caution that it will produce
rather arbitrary clusters when sampled populations exhibit clinal patterns of genetic
variation due to isolation by distance (Pritchard et al. 2000). This description applies to
most human populations, so it makes the results of Structure problematic and difficult to
interpret in many cases. In fact, Rosenberg et al. (2005) explicitly stated: “Our evidence
for clustering should not be taken as evidence of our support of any particular concept of
‘biological race.’”
Contrary to Wade’s assertion, Structure didn’t simply identify five clusters in the
Rosenberg et al. (2002) data set. It also identified two, three, four, six, and seven
clusters.3 Why? Researchers using Structure have to define the number (K) of clusters in
advance, because that’s what the program requires. So where does Wade get the idea that
K = 5 is the most statistically supported number of clusters? Not from Rosenberg et al.
(2002).
There are a few statistical methods for identifying which choice of K is “best.”
Structure itself provides an estimate of the log probability of the data for each value of K
[LnP(D)]. However, using this estimate to choose among values of K is not without some
controversy—the authors of Structure caution that it “merely provides an ad hoc
approximation” and the “biological interpretation of K may not be straightforward”
(Pritchard et al. 2010: 15). In their simulation study, Evanno et al. (2005) observed that
LnP(D) wasn’t necessarily maximized at the correct value for K. They recommend
instead the measure of ∆K, or the second-order rate of change of the likelihood function
with respect to K (essentially, how much better each value of K is compared with the

preceding value of K). Many researchers follow this practice, although it has been argued
against (Waples and Gaggiotti 2006).
Importantly, Rosenberg et al. (2002, 2005) do not report the LnP(D) (or ∆K) for
any of the values for K, so those articles do not tell us which number of clusters are most
likely present in the data set. Bolnick (2008) reports information about the unpublished
LnP(D) values:
No single value of K clearly maximized the probability of the observed data.
Probabilities increased sharply from K=1 to K=4 but were fairly similar for values
of K ranging from 4 to 20. The probability of the observed data was higher for
K=6 than for smaller values of K, but not as high for some replicates of larger
values of K. The highest Pr (X|K) was associated with a particular replicate of
K=16, but that value of K was also associated with very low probabilities when
the individuals were grouped into 16 clusters in other ways. Consequently it is
uncertain which number of genetic clusters best fits this data set, but there is no
clear evidence that K=6 is the best estimate. (Bolnick 2008, 77; based on
information provided by personal communication from N. Rosenberg)
Wade does not seem to have read any of the papers critical of interpretations of
Rosenberg et al.’s (2002) data as evidence for human racial divisions, such as Bolnick
(2008) or Templeton (2013). Nor does he seem to have noticed Rosenberg et al.’s (2002)
omission of any statistical evaluation of the different K values. They do highlight “six
main genetic clusters, five of which correspond to major geographic regions” within the
abstract, making one wonder whether Wade carefully read the rest of the paper. I would
like to believe that a veteran science reporter would not be so cavalier as to selectively

read only sources that support his position. Wade evidently seems to like K = 5 simply
because it matches the number of inhabited continents: “It might be reasonable to elevate
the Indian and Middle Eastern groups to the level of major races, making seven in all. But
then many more subpopulations could be declared races, so to keep things simple, the
five-race, continent-based scheme seems the most practical for most purposes” (100).
Practical. Simple. Wade wants us to cut up human diversity into five races not because
that’s what the statistical analyses support but because thinking about it as a gradient is
hard.
Nobody (least of all contributors to this journal!) is denying that humans vary
physically and genetically. But observed patterns of human genetic diversity simply don’t
fit with any scientifically viable definition of race as a taxonomic unit (Templeton 2013).
In order to find biological support for folk classifications of race, Wade has decided that
certain patterns of variation are more important than others. The five-part division of
races seems “logical” to Wade because there are five continents. Anticipating confusion
on this point, he claims: “Those who assert that human races don’t exist like to point to
the many, mutually inconsistent classification schemes that have recognized anywhere
from 3 to 60 races. But the lack of agreement doesn’t mean that races don’t exist, only
that it is a matter of judgment as to how to define them” (92, emphasis mine).
So, rather than being defined by empirical criteria, as Wade had asserted so
confidently earlier in the book, it really is just a subjective judgment call. The differences
between groups are so subtle and gradual that no objective lines can be drawn, so Wade
draws his own on the basis of his own preconceptions. In other words, he can’t define
distinct races. He just knows them when he sees them.

There is a great deal more in this book that deserves critique, such as Wade’s
assertion that the genetic differences between human groups determine behavioral
differences, resurrecting the specter of “national character” and “racial temperaments.”
But as I have shown here, it’s all pseudoscientific rubbish because he can’t justify his
first and primary point: that the human racial groups we recognize today are scientifically
meaningful, distinct biological divisions of humans.
Finally, it is worth noting that, throughout the book, Wade repeatedly calls
attention to the fact that his view on race is contrary to that of anthropologists and
sociologists. In responses to criticisms of his book (including an earlier online version of
this review) he insists that “by denying the existence of race, social scientists are
intimidating biologists from pursuing this path” (Wade 2014)—a claim belied by the
robust criticism of his book by geneticists, evolutionary biologists, and physical
anthropologists). This ploy is a variation on the Galileo fallacy: the fact that one bravely
holds a minority view in science is considered to be sufficient evidence of the worth of
one’s position. I have seen it used over and over again in responses to criticisms of
pseudoscience, and it is no more persuasive for Wade than it is for creationists or
homeopaths.

Notes
1. This review incorporates material that has previously appeared in the Huffington Post
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-raff/nicholas-wade-and-race-building-ascientific-facade_b_5375137.html) and Violent Metaphors

(http://violentmetaphors.com/2014/05/21/nicholas-wade-and-race-building-a-scientificfacade/).
2. See Agustín Fuentes’s online debate with Wade sponsored by the American
Anthropological Association, available at
https://aaanetevents.webex.com/ec0701lsp11/eventcenter/recording/recordAction.do?the
Action=poprecord&AT=pb&internalRecordTicket=4832534b000000021dea9fff10e4adb
e92477105faf7337d575f8022218d05ffd3d0cede6594483c&renewticket=0&isurlact=true
&recordID=8614987&apiname=lsr.php&format=short&needFilter=false&&SP=EC&rID
=8614987&RCID=e801bfd96855006077205e3d2e023699&siteurl=aaanetevents&actapp
name=ec0701lsp11&actname=%2Feventcenter%2Fframe%2Fg.do&rnd=5083844903&e
ntappname=url0201lsp11&entactname=%2FnbrRecordingURL.do.
3. It actually identified up to 20 divisions, but clusters 1–7 are the primary ones discussed
in Rosenberg et al. (2002). The same study also divided their worldwide sample up into
regions, and then ran Structure within those regions, to look at finer-scale population
structure (see Bolnick 2008).
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Table 1. Various Numbers of Races Referred to by Wade in A Troublesome Inheritance
Number of

Definition

Page

3

Africans, East Asians, Europeans, “as well as many smaller groups”

2

3

Africans, East Asians, Caucasians (doesn’t mention Native Americans)

4

5

Africans, East Asians, Caucasians, Native Americans,

64

Races

Australians/Papua New Guineans
3

Caucasians, East Asians, Africans

70

7

Five continental races, Indian subcontinent, people of the Middle East

96

5 or 7

Five continental groups but two additional groups recognized

100

genetically: Central/Southern Asia and Middle East
4

European, East Asian, American Indian, African

115

3

“Major races”

121

5

“Major races”

242

